Perceptual Intentionality: Correcting The Bad Argument And Understanding Direct Realism.pdf

John R. Searle critiques the widespread philosophical belief that perception involves only experiencing mental contents (sense data) rather than directly engaging with external objects. He identifies this as "the Bad Argument" stemming from an ambiguity in key terms like "aware of" and "conscious of."

The Bad Argument:

- The Argument from Illusion claims that since hallucinations can mimic perceptual experiences, and the content is identical in both cases, our experiences must be based on sense data rather than material objects.
- This argument assumes that "aware of" and "sees" mean the same thing throughout: identifying a distinct mental entity (sense data).
- Searle argues this is a fallacy due to ambiguity. "Aware of" has two senses:
- Intentionality sense: We are aware of an object (e.g., seeing a desk). Here, awareness and the object are not identical.
- Constitutive sense: Awareness is the object (e.g., feeling pain from pressing against a desk). Awareness and the sensation are identical.
- Applying this to hallucinations, in the intentionality sense, we aren't aware of anything during a hallucination; but in the constitutive sense, we have a conscious experience identical to perception.

Searle's Critique:

- The Argument from Illusion conflates these two senses of "aware of," leading to the false conclusion that we don't perceive directly.
- Direct realism, which posits direct awareness of external objects, is not as contradictory as the argument suggests.
- Common sense and our experience support direct realism, making its rejection by Great Philosophers surprising but traceable to the Argument from Illusion's ambiguity.